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where ℓ∗(j) is the agent allocated the task for agent j under the efﬁcient allocation rule. Let EV be
the total expected value from all tasks:
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Note that the total expected value of all tasks is greater than the sum of the expected payments
over all agents, that is:
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Thus, the centre always proﬁts from the mechanism. A lower bound on the difference between total
expected value and total expected payments is [
 
i∈I η
ℓ∗(i)
i +(n−1)x]/n. Note also that the lower
bound on the centre’s proﬁt from the mechanism increases with the lower bound on EQOS x.
As we pointed out in the discussion of Example 6 in Section 3.3.2, if the centre is trying to min-
imise payments, it could give up on individual rationality, by increasing Bi, at the cost of inducing
some agent types not to participate in the mechanism. This may be appealing when the probability
of task failure is high; in such cases, the centre may prefer to avoid paying an amount almost as large
as the total value of the tasks. On the other hand, in a number of practical applications the centre
may want to use the mechanism that induces participation by all types, described in this section.
This is certainly the case, for example, if the lower bound on EQOS (i.e., the lower bound on the
probability that tasks are successful) is high. Moreover, our mechanism with participation by all
types is appropriate when the centre mainly seeks to maximise social welfare. Consider, for exam-
ple, a government that is trying to boost the economy through major public infrastructure projects.
In order to do so, it may be willing to invest in the trust-based mechanism to get the best infrastruc-
tures built at the cheapest cost. Moreover, the government may be willing to make a low proﬁt in
order to ensure the survivability of the construction companies by guaranteeing them some payoff
if they participate in the mechanism. Another example where a company might want to involve all
task performers would be a company trying to acquire as much information as possible about all
task performers in order to maximise the returns on its future decisions. Following from our run-
ning scenario, say MovePictures.com needs to contract a video editing company to add computer
graphics to a movie that may become a blockbuster if the graphics are well done. In case the task
is successful, MoviePictures.com is likely to get many contracts in the future. It is therefore critical
that all the available information is collected from agents in order to choose the most reliable video
editing company. In this case, MoviePictures.com may accept a smaller short-run proﬁt by running
our mechanism with full participation, in order to guarantee that the selected agent is the best one
and that future contracts will be obtained.
To summarise, in this section we have devised a mechanism that is incentive compatible, indi-
vidually rational and efﬁcient for task allocation under uncertainty when multiple distributed reports
are used in order to judge this uncertainty. It is to be noted that we did not need two-stage mecha-
nisms, as in the work of Mezzetti (2004), because in our settings we can condition payments on the
completion of the tasks (the indicator function κ( ) captures this dependence of payments on task
completion). So far, we have just considered the economic properties of the mechanisms, but as we
argued earlier, this is only part of the picture. In the next section, we report on its implementation.
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The set of all hyperedges containing valuations of the very same agent i is deﬁned as:
Ev
i =
 
τ⊆T
Ev
i (τ)
Then, the set of hyperedges connecting nodes in V to nodes in A is deﬁned as:
Ev =
 
i∈I
Ev
i
Given this, we deﬁne the valuation hypergraph as a pair:
Hv = (V ∪ A,Ev)
Thus, each hyperedge in Hv consists of a single valuation vertex corresponding to an element in V
along with a complete task allocation for the valued tasks out of the task-per-bidder nodes in A.
The valuation hypergraph Hv partly deﬁnes the space within which a solution needs to be found.
However, in order to deﬁne the quality of the solution found, it is important to deﬁne the weight
attached to each hyperedge of the hypergraph Hv. The weight of a hyperedge is actually equal to
the expected value of the allocation of the tasks to a set of task performers (bidders). Consider,
for instance, valuation v1(τ1,τ2). All the possible matchings that fulﬁl it are represented by all the
pairs (τ.←1
1 ,τ.←1
2 ). For example, the hyperedge e2 involving the pairing (τ4←1
1 ,τ2←1
2 ) denotes that
agent 4 performs task 1 for agent 1 and agent 2 performs task 2 for agent 1. The expected valuation
associated to this allocation depends on the POS of agents 4 and 2 when performing tasks τ1 and τ2
respectively.
In this case, the expected valuation associated to e2 is assessed as:
v1(τ4←1
1 ,τ2←1
2 ) = v1(τ1,τ2)   p4(τ4←1
1 )   p2(τ2←1
2 )+
v1(τ1)   p4(τ4←1
1 )   (1 − p2(τ2←1
2 ))+
v1(τ2)   (1 − p4(τ4←1
1 ))   p2(τ2←1
2 )
(23)
where p is a function that returns the POS of the agent that is assigned a given task (computed using
conﬁdence, reputation, or trust). Notice that the value (1 − pi(τ
i←j
k )) represents the probability of
agent i failing to perform task τk for agent j. Since no requests are submitted for τ1 and τ2 alone,
v(τ1) = v(τ2) = 0. Thus, the expected valuation associated to the particular allocation represented
by arc e2 becomes v1(τ4←1
1 ,τ2←1
2 ) = v1(τ1,τ2)   p4(τ4←1
1 )   p2(τ2←1
2 ). With a similar argument,
we obtain v1(τ4←1
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2 ) = v1(τ1,τ2)   p4(τ4←1
1 )   p5(τ5←1
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to hyperedge e3.
Generalising, given a hyperedge e ∈ Ev with valuation vi(τ), we can readily build an allocation
for the tasks in τ from the elements in e and vi(τ). If p is a function that returns the POS (be it
conﬁdence, reputation, or trust) of a given task performer from each requester’s point of view, then
we can compute the expected valuation of the allocation deﬁned by hyperedge e as follows:
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5.2.1 OBJECTIVE FUNCTION AND SIDE CONSTRAINTS
The translation of Equation (25) into an IP is reasonably straightforward given our representation.
Thus, solving the GTBM task allocation problem amounts to maximising the following objective
function:
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ye′   wc(e′) (26)
where xe ∈ {0,1} is a binary decision variable representing whether the valuation in hyperedge
e is selected or not, and ye′ ∈ {0,1} is a binary decision variable representing whether the bid in
hyperedge e′ is selected or not. Thus, xe is a decision variable that selects a given valuation with a
given task-bidder matching, and ye′ selects a given bid.
However, some side constraints must be fulﬁlled in order to obtain a valid solution. First, the
semantics of the bidding language must be satisﬁed. Second, if a hyperedge containing a set of task-
per-bidder nodes in A is selected, we must ensure that the bids covering such nodes are selected too.
Moreover, as we employ the XOR bidding language, the auctioneer — the centre in our case — can
only select at most one bid per bidder and at most one valuation per asker. Thus, as for bidders, this
constraint translates into:  
e′∈Ec
i
ye′ ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I (27)
For instance, in Figure 1 this constraint ensures the auctioneer selects one hyperedge out of e′
1,e′
2,
and e′
3, since they all belong to agent 4 (they all come from nodes labelled with the same subscript
c4(.)).
For the valuations, the XOR constraints involving them are collected in the following expres-
sion:  
e∈Ev
i
xe ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I (28)
For instance, in Figure 1 this constraint forces the auctioneer to select one hyperedge out of e1, e2,
e3, e4, and e5 since they all belong to agent 1 (they all come from nodes labelled with the same
subscript v1(.)).
If a valuation hyperedge e ∈ Ev is selected, the set of task-per-bidder nodes in A connected
to e must be performed by the corresponding bidder agent. For instance, in Figure 1, if hyperedge
e5 is selected, the task-per-bidder nodes τ4←1
1 and τ4←1
3 must be covered by some bid of agent 4.
In this case, bid c4(τ1,τ3) is the one covering those tasks. Thus, if we select hyperedge e5 we are
forced to select bid c4(τ1,τ3) by selecting hyperedge e′
3. Thus, in terms of hyperedges, we must
ensure that the number of valuation hyperarcs containing a given task-per-bidder node is less than
or equal to the number of bid hyperarcs containing it. Graphically, this means that the number of
incident valuation hyperedges in a given node a ∈ A must be less than the number of incident bid
hyperedges in a.
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In case of no free-disposal (i.e., if we do not allow agents to execute tasks without them being asked
for) we simply have to replace ≤ with =. To summarise, solving the GTBM task allocation problem
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